The real and perceived risks of genetically modified organisms by Torgersen, Helge
©2004 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORGANIZATION EMBO reports   VOL 5 | SPECIAL ISSUE | 2004
The real and perceived risks of genetically modified
organisms
The debate about the potential risks of genetically modified organisms has been going on for almost three
decades without any final conclusion in sight. Why is it that the public remains critical of this technology
although science has so far not demonstrated any tangible risks for human health and the environment? 
Helge Torgersen
The debate about the various risks ofgenetically modified organisms(GMOs) has been with us for almost a
lifetime, ever since a voluntary moratorium
on some recombinant DNA research was
declared in Asilomar, California, in 1975.
Whereas the original concerns centred on
the risks of GM technology in general, in
recent years it has shifted to GM crops and
food. Whenever an application to release or
commercialise a new product is filed,
European regulators are caught in a dilem-
ma between contested claims of safety on
one side, and claims of risks on the other.
This has led to numerous scientific investi-
gations, reports and assessments to estab-
lish, possibly once and for all, whether a
particular risk claim is substantiated and
thus relevant. But despite years of research
and huge amounts of money, all attempts to
bring this hardly fruitful debate to an end
have been futile. GM products, apart from
medicines, have not made it to the super-
market shelves in significant numbers in
Europe. In this article, I will argue that, con-
trary to voices calling for a risk-only-based
regulation, the difficulties for GM products
have been aggravated exactly because these
debates, regulations and policies have con-
centrated solely on risk and have neglected
other issues.
Although health and environmental con-
cerns have always constituted main ele-
ments of the debate on GM crops, they are
not the only problems of which the
European public is wary. Many of the issues
that determined the GM debate did not in
fact originate from risk in a scientific under-
standing, but rather from a plethora of other
arguments. Economic, political and reli-
gious considerations, although they have
varied over time and between different
countries, have played a major role from the
beginning. It was not least due to these non-
scientific concerns that the debate about
GMOs has had so many political repercus-
sions in Europe and continues to put its
mark on the biotechnology debate today.
Over the course of this debate, which has
spanned more than 30 years, themes and
perceptions have changed and shifted. 
Media analysis is a great tool to identify
different phases of the debate (Bauer &
Gaskell, 2002). For instance, during the
1970s, the excitement over molecular biol-
ogy as a new scientific endeavour dominat-
ed media coverage of this field. When pub-
lic concerns emerged, triggered by risk
claims from within the scientific communi-
ty, experts were initially able to reassure the
public about the safety of this new technolo-
gy. However, when biotechnology’s eco-
nomic prospects became a main issue dur-
ing the early 1980s, reporting changed
profoundly. Now it was the biotech industry
that had to defend itself against criticism
that came from safety concerns but also
from a generally critical view of industry
that was in fashion at that time. What is also
interesting is that promoters and opponents
of biotechnology both began linking con-
cerns with other contested issues, such as
repercussions for healthcare and agricul-
ture. In this way, the range of arguments
extended beyond those on risks while often
adding a strong national flavour and claims
of potential benefits to the debate. In
response to these conflicts, European gov-
ernments began to regulate biotechnology
in the 1980s. These national laws and regu-
lations prompted the institutions of the
European Union (EU) to promote harmoni-
sation for the emerging common market of
biotechnology products. Yet, not only the
regulations, but also the particular debates,
varied considerably among EU member
states, which made harmonisation a difficult
task. In the 1990s, biotechnology was even-
tually accepted—by and large—and the
conflicts in most countries had died down.
In fact, it looked like biotechnology was on
its way to becoming a virtually uncontested
industry, similar to the chemical or pharma-
ceutical businesses.
These first rounds of the conflicts weremostly about the industrial use ofGMOs in closed containment, such as
the production of pharmaceuticals. But
when GM crops and GM food products
emerged in the mid-1990s, environmental
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and consumer protection groups took up
the issue again on a broader base. As a
result, old conflicts reappeared over new
risk claims. Existing regulations turned out
to be inadequate for GM crops, and opposi-
tion emerged even in those countries where
the public had previously been fairly posi-
tive towards biotechnology. In light of this
resistance, regulators pulled the emergency
brake and issued a de facto moratorium for
GM crops at the EU level. New regulations
were devised to address new risk aspects.
Interestingly, it is mainly the European pop-
ulace that looks at GM crops and foods with
suspicion—in the USA and other parts of the
world, these new products met far less resis-
tance.
At present, the new regulatory tools seem
to be not very efficient. For instance, the EU
was not able to conclude whether or not to
approve GM Bacillus thuringiensis toxin
maize products after some member coun-
tries argued that unresolved risk problems
would not allow them to distribute these
products. However, it appears as if there
were political rather than scientific reasons
behind this resistance. In the present legal
setting, only the European Commission is
ultimately able to end such an impasse—in
favour of the application, one would expect.
Nevertheless, the situation with GM crops
has resurrected past regulatory struggles that
previously ended in limbo. 
To prevent such a political stalemate,
governments all over the world and interna-
tional bodies, such as the EU and the Office
for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD; Paris, France), have
repeatedly emphasised the importance of
adequate risk regulation to ensure con-
sumer acceptance. Such regulation needs
well-defined criteria to determine when
regulators should take action. This
approach seems to work fine elsewhere and
for other technologies, so why is it so diffi-
cult in Europe to regulate biotechnology? It
is not only a problem for Europe’s scientists
and biotech industry, but has also led to a
trade battle with the USA, whose adminis-
tration has brought the dispute over GM
crops to the World Trade Organization
(Moore, 2003). The US administration
alleges that the European regulatory
approach is not properly risk-based (Miller,
1997), in other words, that science has too
little, and politics too much, to say. As a
result, risk gets mixed up with other issues,
and political and economic arguments dis-
tort the rational scientific determination of
risks as the sole basis for decision-making.
If only sound science would govern this
process, proponents of GM crops argue,
technological progress and trade would be
unhindered, as biotechnology poses hardly
any new risks.
The appeal of this argument is that it is
consistent and easily understood by scien-
tists and politicians alike. It may even cater
to European social science theory (Schelsky,
1965), which, although somewhat outdat-
ed, suggests that independent and disinter-
ested knowledge is superior over interest-
driven politics. Finally, and most important,
only scientifically backed arguments can
stand legal challenge in courts. The disad-
vantages are that this concept is somewhat
fictitious, as we will see, and that it obvious-
ly does not work in Europe. The debate
appears to go in circles with no end in sight,
despite novel approaches such as traceabili-
ty and segregation of GM and conventional
crops.
One reason for this impasse is that itis still not clear what ‘adequate reg-ulation’ means in reality. It largely
depends on separating legitimate risk claims
from illegitimate ones; in other words, to
determine which risk is ‘real’ and has to be
addressed and which is only ‘perceived’ and
thus irrelevant. Obviously, it is not easy to
discern a real from a perceived risk—real for
whom, according to which expert and per-
ceived by which part of the public or which
stakeholder? And what exactly is the differ-
ence between real and perceived risks from
a political point of view? After all, perceived
risks are relevant in politics, due to their
potential to mobilise the public. They are
therefore real, albeit in a different way than
scientists would think.
In light of these continuous and self-
renewing risk claims, regulators would like
to have an instrument at hand to determine,
once and for all, whether a risk is real or per-
ceived. Science seems to offer such a tool: if
only those risks are acknowledged that can
be scientifically demonstrated, then all
other risks must be perceived and thus irrel-
evant. This is the conventional wisdom
behind numerous expert bodies and adviso-
ry committees that have been asked to give
impartial advice based on—and only on—
science.
But even if reality was such that we relied
on science to define risk, what if scientists
come to different conclusions? Which sci-
ences should we ask and who are the
experts on which to rely? Who is a ‘real’
expert as opposed to one who is only ‘per-
ceived’ to be one by the public or stakehold-
ers? Who has material interests at stake and
… risk and its perception is a
social phenomenon rather than a
scientifically determinable factor
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whom can we trust? Questions about the
expertise and performance of individual sci-
entists and the competence of different sci-
entific disciplines have frequently surfaced
in the public debate. Not surprisingly, often
those with the best insight into the field tend
to be associated with other interests, and
conversely, those who are more indepen-
dent seem less knowledgeable. The double-
edged nature of these investigations makes
it even more difficult to come to a legitimate
conclusion.
In addition, critics of GM crops and
foods have repeatedly argued that science
has not always adequately and consistently
dealt with new and contested issues.
Indeed, science appeared sometimes reluc-
tant to acknowledge the relevance of non-
mainstream arguments (Gill et al, 1998),
even if those later turned out to be substan-
tial. Gene flow, for instance, was considered
almost irrelevant in the 1980s because it
was deemed a very rare event. However, it is
now known as a rather common phenome-
non among many organisms, GM or not,
and has become an important research
topic, not only because of the potential risk
in the context of releasing GMOs. In a simi-
lar vein, other issues originally pushed for-
ward by environmental or consumer
activists have become mainstream topics of
research and are now subject to regulatory
efforts. This sequence of events seems to
perpetuate itself: first, a particular risk claim
appears improbable, then research gives
some preliminary hints that become popu-
larised and exaggerated, and subsequently
comparisons are made to the ‘normal’ state
of affairs. After some more inquiry, the nor-
mal state begins to look quite risky. Finally,
the risk is acknowledged but put into per-
spective of what had hitherto been deemed
acceptable. Such a sequence is the normal
process of acquiring and digesting scientific
knowledge, but it sometimes evokes bad
memories of now commonly appraised
phenomena that were formerly deemed
‘irrelevant’ by mainstream science.
Apart from the difficulties for scienceto establish the difference betweenreal and perceived risks, there are
other hurdles to an objective risk determina-
tion that would stand the test of political
legitimacy. One is the very nature of risk
perception. For instance, many scientists,
regulators and industry managers consider
risks from GMOs to be no different than
risks from ‘conventional’ organisms. Yet, the
public obviously perceives risk differently,
and GMOs are often seen as menacing
(Wagner et al, 2002). Thus, scientists often
regard the public to be influenced by non-
rational assumptions about highly unlikely
consequences rather than by risk assess-
ments based on the quantifiable product of
impact and probability.
Social psychology has investigated this
phenomenon and has come up with con-
vincing explanations for these differences in
risk perception (Slovic, 1987). Lay people
assess risks quite differently than experts,
but in a less irrational way than scientists
assume. Risk perception depends on a vari-
ety of factors, such as its ‘dread potential’,
that can hardly be made the subject of sci-
entific investigation. Furthermore, the con-
trol over a new technology and whether or
not a risk is accepted voluntarily plays a
decisive role. Thus, risk perception depends
not only on the source of risk—the organism
and its properties—but also on the context:
what poses a risk, who sets out to mitigate it,
who benefits or suffers from it, who commu-
nicates it and how all this is done. In other
words, risk and its perception is a social
phenomenon rather than a scientifically
determinable factor. This is not to say that
risk is solely socially constructed, but it is
embedded in a context that plays an impor-
tant role in its appraisal or rejection. 
There are other reasons why the debateis still lingering despite variousattempts to influence the public’s per-
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ception of risk. It appears that factual knowl-
edge of science has had little influence on
attitudes (Gaskell et al, 2003), and cam-
paigns to educate a seemingly ignorant pub-
lic did not significantly change attitudes.
Similarly, attempts to show that risks from
GMOs are negligible compared with the
frequently used examples of car travel and
smoking have not convinced sceptics. The
Eurobarometer surveys on biotechnology
have repeatedly shown that a significant
number of Europeans still see substantial
risks with certain applications of biotech-
nology. This has to be accepted as a social
fact, even if some consider it to be the result
of non-governmental organizations’
(NGOs) campaigns. After all, even those
who dislike NGOs have to ask themselves
why people subscribe to their arguments.
One reason might be that there are so many
other issues associated with or linked to the
subject of GMOs that it is easy for cam-
paigners to achieve public resonance.
Attitude research also suggests that risk
perception is not the only determinant for
acceptance; what also plays a major role is
the perception of potential benefits (Gaskell
et al, 2004). On average, a majority of peo-
ple in Europe see risks with GM crops, and,
in the absence of benefits, reject it. This is
actually a rational attitude, as nobody
would be so irrational as to accept a risk,
real or perceived, without any possible rev-
enues. So the question is not whether risk is
low compared with other activities in which
we indulge; instead, the question is what we
get in exchange for accepting certain risks.
Thus, acceptance of GM crops may be con-
siderably higher in countries where benefits
for consumers and producers are obvious,
provided that the issue is not charged with a
long history of futile ideological struggles.
This is, in essence, the hope of biotechnolo-
gy’s promoters for the introduction of GM
crops to tackle agricultural problems of
developing countries. In light of the increas-
ing efforts to export the debate to those
countries, however, any benefits must be
both substantial and equitable to obtain
broad support for biotechnology.
But even the rational choice model has
its limitations, in particular when it comes to
making decisions on risks (Jaeger et al,
2001). Contrary to the assumption that peo-
ple generally perform cost-benefit assess-
ments, Gaskell and colleagues (2004)
showed that risks of GMOs hardly played a
role for a large number of respondents.
Instead, benefits, or in that case the absence
thereof, was the decisive factor. One must
assume that for those respondents, the argu-
ment of negligible risks totally misses the
point. Taken together, these findings suggest
that the importance of ‘objective’ risk deter-
mination for public perception and accep-
tance has been grossly and consistently
overestimated.
The most unfortunate aspect of the con-tinuous quarrel about risk is that other,highly relevant, issues have been kept
in the background. Apart from ethics, we
may take the notion of benefit as a symbol
for those issues. The reason why an explicit
mention of benefit plays a comparatively
small role in decision-making is that usually,
the benefit of an innovative technology is
taken for granted—if there were no benefits
to it, an innovator would not engage in the
costly activity of developing the technology.
Restricting the debate to scientific argu-
ments thus leaves the interest of the innova-
tor as the normative baseline. Resistance in
the past often resulted from the implicit
assumption that innovation is an asset in
itself, and automatically relevant for every-
one. Whereas this may be less contested for
other technologies, for certain applications
of biotechnology it has been a recipe for
failure. In risk-based regulation, there is no
place for such reasoning. Consequently, if
socio-economic considerations play a de
facto role in practical decision-making, they
tend to hide behind scientific risk issues as
the only legitimate arguments to restrict the
use of a technology
It is obvious that technology regulation
based solely on risk is a limited solution, as
it only reflects part of the problem. This is
not to say that there is no role for it—after
all, preventing unintended negative conse-
quences is important and necessary to
enable the implementation of any technolo-
gy. However, only focusing on risk preven-
tion is not enough to make a technology
acceptable to a sceptical public. If its bene-
fits and their distribution are an important
determinant for acceptance, it becomes
clear that we have to acknowledge the polit-
ical nature of the issue. Risk-based regula-
tion must therefore be complemented by
appropriate policies.
This may work both ways, in favour of
decisions where existent perceptions and
the distribution of benefits would suggest a
cautious strategy, as well as in favour of tak-
ing comparatively higher risks when an
urgent need could be met by a particular
biotechnological solution. For example,
detecting buried land mines at moderate
costs with the help of modified bacteria
could persuade even ingrained biotechnol-
ogy opponents, in contrast to force-market-
ing herbicide-tolerant crops that would
The most unfortunate aspect of
the continuous quarrel about
risk is that other, highly relevant,
issues have been kept in the
background
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hardly find acceptance anywhere in Europe.
Likewise, as already mentioned, some GM
crops may well contribute to solving real
problems elsewhere in the world—with an
emphasis on ‘some’. This may be so even if
the risks associated—for example of trans-
ferring certain genes to weeds—are higher
there than in Europe. 
In Europe, this has been partly acknowl-edged, at least, in the field of GM food.The US government is therefore right in
holding that provisions to ensure the ‘free-
dom of choice’, namely labelling and seg-
regation, has little to do with risk-based reg-
ulation. But despite the criticism, it is an
important result of a policy aimed at pro-
viding a credible basis for acceptance irre-
spective of any potential risks. Another
important factor would be to determine the
role of GM crops in an overall appraisal of
European agriculture, in its many forms in
different countries and environments and
according to the many purposes it serves. A
first step in this direction is an assessment of
whether gene flow poses a threat to organic
farming—there are massive economic and
consumer interests associated with the
issue, but hardly any that would legitimate-
ly fall under physical risk. 
Such an appraisal would entail a gener-
al debate about the role of agriculture in
each country—an initiative that is overdue
not only in light of heavy subsidies. All this
obviously has little to do with assessing
risk using scientific instruments and pro-
cedures. But focusing solely on the latter
would obscure our view of the problem.
To discern real from perceived risks is,
therefore, not the question highest at
stake. The most pervasive risk, real and
unfortunately apparent, is that we invest
all our efforts into only one question, and
ignore all the rest. 
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